Gerrymandering decentralization : political selection of grants-financed local jurisdictions

Abstract: This article describes a model that shows how decentralization in developing countries may fuel vote-buying, patronage, and pork-barrel politics, especially in political economy contexts that are inimical to organization of citizens for the broad public interest.

Author(s): Khemani, Stuti

Source(s): , 30 p., ill., tab draft

Published: 2009 Columbia university. Initiative for policy dialogue (IPD), New York, NY (English

ISBN/ISSN: /

Link: http://policydialogue.org/files/events/Khemani_Gerrymandering_Decentralization_Paper.pdf

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in:

WordPress.com Logo

You are commenting using your WordPress.com account. Log Out /  Change )

Google photo

You are commenting using your Google account. Log Out /  Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out /  Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out /  Change )

Connecting to %s